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Abstract.  Sufficiency  conditions for Stackelberg strategies for a class 
of deterministic differential games are derived when the players have 
recall of the previous trajectory. Sufficient conditions for Nash strategies 
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equation is linear, and the cost functional is quadratic. The admissible 
strategies are restricted to be affine in the information available. 
Key Words.  Stackelberg differential games, Nash differential games, 
strategies with memory, sufficiency conditions for game strategies. 
1.  Introduction 
Stackelberg and Nash differential games have received recently a lot of 
attention and have been studied by several researchers. The reader can find 
in Refs. 1 and 5 surveys of basic concepts, definitions, and results concerning 
Stackelberg and Nash games, respectively. These two types of games seem 
to be very promising in studying large-scale systems, hierarchical systems, or 
situations  of conflict in  an  engineering,  economic, or social  context.  The 
definitions of Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium can be found in the liter- 
ature, but we repeat these definitions here for the sake of completeness of 
the presentation. Let U,  V  be two sets and J1, J2 two functions J~: U  x  V -~ 
R, i =  1, 2. Consider the set-valued mapping T 
T 
T : U-> V,  u  --> Tu C_ V, 
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defined by 
Tu = {v Iv = arg inf[J2(u, zT); ,5 c  V]}. 
Clearly,  Tu =  O  if  the  infimum  is  not  achieved.  We  also  consider  the 
minimization problem 
inf Jl ( u, "v ),  subject to u ~ U,  v ~ Tu, 
where we use the usual convention J~(u, v) = +0o, if v ~ Tu = Q. 
(1) 
Definition of a Stackelberg  Equilibrium.  A  pair (u*, v*)~ U × V  is 
called a Stackelberg equilibrium pair if (u*, v*) solves (1). 
In Stackelberg games, it is standard to say that a leader chooses u ~ U 
and has cost J1 and a follower chooses v ~ V  and has cost ./2. 
Definition of a Nash Equilibrium.  A pair (u*, v*) ~ U x  V  is called a 
Nash equilibrium pair if (u*, v*) satisfies 
Jl(U*, v*)~J1(u,/)*), 
J2(u*, v*) <- 12(u*, v), 
for all u ~ U, 
(2) 
for all v ~ V. 
It is a known fact that, in Stackelberg and Nash differential games, the 
resulting trajectory and strategy values vary with the admissible strategy 
spaces. By strategy spaces, we mean the information available to each player 
together with  a  set  of functions with this information as  domain.  These 
functions are actually the permissible ways in which the players are allowed 
to use that information. For example, open-loop strategies, where at each 
instant of time t the players have knowledge of the present time instant t and 
the initial condition x (0), result in different equilibrium from the strategies 
where at. each instant of time t the players have knowledge of x(t), t, x(O). In 
the latter case, the players might be restricted, in addition, to using only 
anne functions of x (t). Most of the results available until now deal with cases 
where the current state or the initial state or both of them are the only 
available information to the players. A  more general situation is to assume 
that,  at  each  instant  of  time,  each  player  knows  something  about  the 
previous values of the state of the system and about the previous values of his 
and  the  other  player's  decisions.  The  first  attempt  to  derive  necessary 
conditions for zero-sum games where the strategies depend at each instant 
of time t on the part of the state trajectory between t -  r and t, where r > 0, 
appears to be in Ref. 2. In Refs. 3 and 4, the zero-sum case is considered 
where one player has a time lag information on the value of the state. In Ref. 
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In  the  present  paper,  we  consider  a  continuous-time,  two-player, 
deterministic differential game with a tinear state equation and two quadra- 
tic cost functionals. We consider the case where the players have, at each 
instant of time, recall of previous values of the trajectory, i.e., they have 
memory. What they remember about the previous values of the trajectory is 
allowed to change with the elapse of time. In our model, a wide range of 
delayed information structures is included, from perfect recall of the pre- 
vious trajectory to recall of only one previous value of the trajectory. Cases 
where information about the past strategy values is available to the players 
are also considered. We consider strategies affine in the available informa- 
tion  and  represent  them  by  using  Lebesque-Stiettjes  integrals.  Both 
Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium concepts are considered, and sufficient 
conditions are  developed for a  particular,  but quite  interesting,  class  of 
problems. Particular emphasis is placed on the Stackelberg case. 
In Ref. 7, the Stackelberg differential game is solved when the leader's 
information at time t is x(t), x(O), t, and he is not restricted to use a linear 
function of x(t).  It is shown there that the leader can in general restrict 
himself to strategies affine in x (t) and that use of nonlinear strategies in x (t) 
will not improve his cost. The arguments of Ref. 7 can be extended to the 
case where the leader's information at time t is {x (0), to -< 0 -< t} and one can 
show that the leader does not in general deteriorate his cost if he uses 
strategies affine in {x(0), to -< 0 -< t}. Therefore, one is motivated to restrict a 
priori  the strategy of the leader to be of the form 
ill [d.~7  (t, s)]x(s)+b(t), 
in which case r/and b are what the leader will actually choose. For given rt 
and b, the follower solves his probtem. Necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the follower's problem can be found in Refs. 10 and 11 (Theorem 5.2), 
respectively. On the other hand, the leader's problem is quite difficult, since 
his unknowns are r/and b. It was also shown in Ref. 7 that the principle of 
optimality holds in Stackelberg games iff the leader's problem can be treated 
as a team problem for both leader and follower. This does not necessarily 
mean that J1 = J2. These remarks motivate us to study Stackelberg games 
where  the solutions are  linear in  {x(0), to -< 0-<t}  and constitute a  team 
solution for the leader's problem. 
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we give an 
example of a Stackelberg game where the leader, by using previous values of 
the state, forces the follower to such a reaction that the leader's final cost is 
the same as it would have been if both leader and follower were striving to 
minimize the leader's cost. The main steps in solving this example serve as an 236  JOTA: VOL. 31, NO. 2, JUNE 1980 
illustration of how a more general case should be analyzed. In Section 3, we 
derive sufficiency  conditions for optimality for a control problem of a special 
form (of interest on its own), which are used in the next sections. In Section 
4, we apply the results of Section 3 to a Stackelberg game where the leader 
has recall of the previous trajectory and the game is such that the solution of 
the Stackelberg game (u*, v*) minimizes the leader's cost over all admissible 
(u, v), i.e., the leader's problem is actually treated as a team problem of both 
the leader and follower. In Section 5, we consider certain special cases and 
generalizations of the Stackelberg game of Section 4. In Section 6, we apply 
the results of Section 3 to a Nash game where the two players have perfect 
recall  of the  whole previous  trajectory.  Finally, we  have  a  conclusions 
section and one appendix. 
Notation.  Let 
C([to, tr], R") = C. 
denote the Banach spaces of continuous function q~: [to, tr] ~ R ", with norm 
II~PI[ = sup{[~,(t)];  t e [to, tf]}, 
where I [ denotes the usual Euclidean distance in R". Let 
Ll([to, t~], R") =LI.. 
denote the Banach space of Lebesgue integrable functions g,: [to, tf] ~ R", 
with norm 
IMI-- f"lq,(t)[ at. 
Let 
L~(Et0, tr], R ~) = L~o,~ 
denote  the  Banach  space  of Lebesgue  measurable  functions which  are 
almost everywhere bounded, with norm 
11911  = ess sup{Iq~(t) [, t e [to, tr]}. 
And let 
NBV([to, tf], R") = NBV 
denote the Banach space of normalized functions of bounded variation, i.e., 
continuous from the right on (to, tr), zero at t  r, and 
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A  norm  in  one  of  these  spaces  is  denoted  sometimes  by 
It' IIc, I1" lkl, II" ItNBv. B* denotes the conjugate space of a Banach space B. If 
x* e B* and x e B, we write (x*, x) = x*(x). The prime denotes transpose for 
vectors and matrices. 
2.  Introductory Example 
In  this  section,  we provide an example  of a  Stackelberg differential 
game where the leader uses the previous values of the state in calculating his 
control values. The game considered is such that the leader, by using this 
type of strategy,  forces the follower to such a  reaction that  the leader's 
optimal cost is the one that he would achieve if both leader and follower had 
as their common objective the minimization  of the leader's cost; i.e., the 
leader's problem to minimize J1 is actually treated as a team problem where 
the team is composed of both the leader and the follower. A  similar idea 
occurs in Ref. 9. The strategies found provide a Stackelberg equilibrium 
pair,  with  the  property  above, for  any xo.  Also,  the  dependence  of the 
leader's control values on previous state values is not trivial, in the sense that 
the same result (team solution of the leader's problem) cannot be achieved 
by strategies depending only on current state value information. We develop 
the example in such a way that the proof of the optimality of the indicated 
strategies is clear. Actually, we do not give only one example, but provide a 
way of constructing  a  whole class  of Stackelberg  games with  the  above 
properties. 
Consider the following state equation and cost functionals 
2=2x+u+v,  x(0) = x0,  te[O, 1],  (3) 
1 
J1 =4x(1)2+ fo  (6x2+u2+v 2) dr,  (4) 
1 
J2=2x(1)2+ !  (qx2 +rv 2) dr,  (5) 
where x, u, v are scalar-valued. The solution of the problem 
minimize J1, 
tt, v 
is 
where k  solves 
subject to (3), 
= -2kx,  ~ = -2kx, 
-k =3+4k-4k  2,  k(1)=2, 
(6) 
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and is given explicitly by 
k(t)  - 
15 + exp[8(t -  1)] 
10- 2 exp[8(t -  1)]" 
We want to show that there exist q, r, 11, 12, SO that the problem 
has the solution 
and that 
minimize J2, 
t~ 
subject to 2 = 2x + tlX q- 12Z + V, 
(8) 
v* = tzlx +/z2z,  (10) 
ll(t)x*(t)  + 12(t)z*(t)  = -2k(t)x*(t),  t ~ [0, 1],  (11) 
v*[t = tz~(t)x*(t) + IX2(t)z*(t)  = -2k(t)x*(t),  t ~ [0, 1],  (12) 
12(t) ~  O,  t ~ [0, 1],  (13) 
for any Xo, where x* is the common optimal trajectory of the problems (9) 
and (6), since (11) and (12) will hold. 
It is clear that, if conditions (11) and (12) are satisfied, then the pair 
/.  t 
u  = ll(t)x(t)+  12(t) J0 x(~') dr,  v = -2k(t)x(t) 
constitutes a  Stackelberg equilibrium pair for the Stackelberg differential 
game associated with (3)-(5) and where 
U={utvalue  of  u  at  time  t  is  given  by  u(xt, t),  where  x,e 
C([O,t],R),xt(O)=x(O)  for  all  O~[O,t],u(x,t)  is  Frechet 
differentiable in xt and piecewise continuous in t ~ [0, 1]}, 
V={vlv  is a  function of x(t)  and t, at time t, v(x, t)  is continuous in 
x ~ R  and piecewise continuous in t e [0, 1]}. 
We set 
a (t) = 2-4k(t),  (14) 
and thus the optimal trajectory for the problem (6) is 
x*(t) = exp [I0t a(~  ") d,]'Xo, 
t  t  fo (oxp[ o 
(15) 
x(O) =xo, 
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The solution v* of (9) is 
where 
v* = -(1/r)(plx  +p~z),  (16) 
From (21) and (22), setting 
w gP2+¢P3, 
we obtain 
= -2rk12-  (2-4k)w,  w(1) =  O.  (26) 
Solving (20)  for p2 + ~pp3 and substituting  into  (26),  we obtain  finally the 
following system, equivalent to (20)-(25): 
[2~ork + I2[rk + 2(1 -  2k)~rk + (d/dt)(~rk)] 
+ [(d/dt)(2rk 2 + 3r -  ~k) + 2(1 -  2k)(2rk 2 + 6r -  2ik)] 
+ [(1 -  2k)q -  ½~] =  0,  (27) 
-/5~=2(2+ll)pa+2pz+q-(l/r)p~,  p1(1)=2, 
-/sz = 12pl + (2 + lt)p2 + P3 -  (1/r)p~p2,  p2(1) =  0,  (17) 
-/53 = 212p2- (1/r)p~,  p3(1) = 0. 
Substituting (t5) and (16) in (11) and (12), we obtain 
Pl = 2rk -pzq~,  ll =  -2k  -  [2@,  (18) 
where 
u,(t) = (/o~eXp[j~*,~(o-)do']  dr)(exp[fot~(r)dr]).  (19) 
Since ~  = z/x, it is easy to see that 
~b = 2 -  (2 -  4k)¢. 
Substituting pl, ll from (18) into (17), we obtain further 
212~ork -  ( pz + ¢p3) -  q + 4rk 2 + 6r -  2*k = 0,  (20) 
-P2 = t2(2rk -P2~) -  (2 -  2k -  I25~)p2 +P3 -  (1/r)(2rk -  P2~)P2,  (21) 
-/53 = 2t2P2 -  (1/r)p ~,  (22) 
2r(1)k(1)-pz(1)~(1)  = 2,  (23) 
p2(1) = O,  (24) 
p3(1) =  O.  (25) 240  JOTA:  VOL. 31, NO.  2, JUNE  1980 
-{~3 = 212(w -  ~¢p3) -  (1/r)(w  -  ~p3) 2, 
w = 212~prk  -q +4rkZ+6r-2ik, 
P2 "~" W  Jr- ~P3, 
/2(1) = ½(-11 + 4i(1) + q (1))q~  (1)  -1, 
p3(1) = O, 
r(1) =}. 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
We can choose now r, q, 12, ll SO as to satisfy (27)-(33) and (18). We 
choose r(t) to be a twice-differentiable function of t ~ [0, 1], with 
r(t)>0,  r(1)=½, 
and q(t) to be a differentiable function of t. Obviously, q and r can be chosen 
so that the linear differential equation for 12 [Eq. (27)] with initial condition 
(31) has the solution Iz(t) ¢~ O. For example, let 
1 
r=~,  q -= constant ~  11. 
Notice that the differential equation (27) for 12 can be solved explicitly for 12 
as soon as r and q are specified, since ¢  and k are known. Nonetheless, since 
~p(0) = 0, the point t = 0 is a singular point of this differential equation. The 
singularity was sort of expected to appear, since (as it has been shown in Ref. 
7)  the  leader's problem  is  singular  with  respect to the partial derivative 
O(u  (x (t), t)/Ox of his control; and arguments similar to those in Ref. 7 can be 
used to show that this holds even for the case where u is allowed to be of the 
more general form u (xt, t). Notice also that the only essential restriction on 
the  follower's cost,  in  order for the leader to  achieve his  team solution 
(allowing even 12 = 0), is that r(1) = ½. 
If the leader were allowed to use a  strategy u(x, t) which is perhaps 
nonlinear in the current state x(t), but he was not permitted to use previous 
values of the state, then it should again be true that 
u(x*(t), t)=-2k(t)x*(t),  for every Xo, 
i.e., 
u(exp[ffa(z)drJxo,  t)=-2k(t)exp[ffa(r)dr]xo,  for all Xo~ R, 
from which we obtain that u  is linear in x. Therefore, we conclude that, for 
the given example, if the leader wishes to achieve his team solution (for any 
Xo) when he applies his Stackelberg strategy and cannot do that with a linear 
strategy in  x(t), he cannot do it with  a  nonlinear strategy in x(t)  either. 
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In  the  example  presented  here,  the  two  crucial  steps  were  the 
identifications (11), (12) and the use of the fact that the conditions (16), (17) 
are sufficient to characterize completely the optimal reaction of the follower 
to the leader's strategy 
t* t 
u = ll(t)x(t)+12(t) J0 x(~') dr. 
Therefore, in order to generalize the procedure presented to cases where 
more general types of strategies are used by the leader, one should provide 
sufficient conditions for the problem faced by the follower, in addition to 
imposing identifications  similar  to  (11)  and  (12).  In the next section, we 
prove sufficiency conditions for a special type of control problem, which we 
will use later in guaranteeing the optimality of the follower's reaction, when 
the leader uses strategies represented as continuous linear functionals over 
the whole previous trajectory. 
3.  A  Control Problem with State-Control Constraints 
Consider the following problem [Problem (P)]: 
minimize J=½[x'(tr)Fx(tf)+ Io~(x'(t)O(t)x(t)+ u'(t)R(t)u(t)) dt  1,  (34) 
subject to 2(t)=A(t)x(t)+B(t)u(t),  x(to)=Xo,  (35) 
ftlr[djl(t,s)]x(s)+ftie[d~rll(t,s)]u(s)=q(t),  (36) 
U E L~,m, 
where the matrices A, B, O = O'~ 0, R  = R'-- 0 are piecewise continuous 
functions of time, x(t)e R n, u(t)~ R m, and where the interval [to, tf], the 
matrix F  = F' >- 0, and q ~ Lt.k are fixed. The solution x (t) of (35) is assumed 
to be absolutely continuous,  so that  (35) holds  almost everywhere with 
respect to the Lebesgue measure in [to, tf]. The integrals in (36) should be 
interpreted as Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals. The matrix-valued function 
~(t, 0), rl: [to, tf]xR ~R kx~ 
is measurable in (t, 0), normalized so that 
0,  for 0 -> tf, 
n(t, 0)=  n(t, to),  for O<-to. 
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rt(t, 0)  is  continuous from  the  left in  0  on  (to, tr),  7/(t, 0)  has  bounded 
variation in 0 on [to, tr] for each t, and there is a c e LI,1, such that 
I]Itl  r [dsrl (t,s)]~ (s),,Ll<-c(t)['~1 c'  (38) 
for all t ~ [to, t~] and for all ~p ~ C,. Exactly the same assumptions hold for 
nl: [to, tr]x R -> R k~m, 
with  cl  replacing  c  in  (38).  *7  and  r/1  are  given  for Problem  (P).  The 
dimension k  is arbitrary but fixed. 
Problem  (P)  is of interest to us, since we will use the results of this 
section  in  the  next  ones,  where  we  will  consider  games  with  delayed 
information structure. Nonetheless, it is of interest on its own. It is worthy to 
point out that Problem  (P) is of a  quite general form, since for example 
Problem (P'), 
minimize ½[ x'(t~)Fx( t~) + I£ f (y'(t)Oy(t) + u'~ (t)R (t)u~(t)) dt] , 
subjecttox(t)=I~ir[dsrll(t,s)]x(s)+Itlr[ds712(t,s)]a(s), 
y(t)=Iti~[d, rl3(t,s)]x(s),  (39) 
ul(t)= I, if[d, rln(t, s)]bt(s), 
x (to) = Xo, 
can be brought to the form of Problem (P) by introducing 
u2(t)= I,i~[d~l(t, s)]x(s), 
u3(t)= It£~[d~rl2(t, s)]x(s),  (40) 
U4(t) = y(t). 
Using (39), (40), Problem (P') can be written equivalently as 
f  minimize ½ x'(tr)Fx(tr)+  (u~Ou4+u'~Rul) d  ,  (41) 
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subject to 2(t) = u2(t)+ u3(t), 
gll  =  [d'rl4] ~'l,  /,/2 =  [d'~ 1]x, 
o  o 
u3 =  [d~72]x,  u4 =  [d@]x, 
o  ¢o 
(42) 
where  the  role  of  x  and  u  in  (35),  (36),  is  played  now  by  x  and 
(/~, /~l, U2, U3, b/4), respectively. Clearly, (42) is of the form (36). 
In the following theorem, we give sufficiency conditions for optimality 
for Problem (P). The proof is carried out by reformulating Problem (P) as a 
constrained optimization problem  in a  Banach space  and is given in the 
Appendix. 
Theorem  3.1.  Consider  Problem  (P),  and  assume  that  there  exist 
functions 
/x : [to, q]~R ",  A ¢ L~,k,  x* : [to, trieR ~,  u*~Lo~,,~, 
where/x is of bounded variation on [to, tr] and continuous from the right on 
(to, q), and x* is absolutely continuous, which satisfy (35), (36), and 
f,  fir,  -  q(R('c)u*(r)+B'(r)tx(~')) dr+  ~1 (% t)A(r) dr = 0,  (43) 
o 
tz(t)-  (O(~')x*('r)+A'('r)tz(r)) dr+  r/(r, t)Z(r) dr=Fx(te).  (44) 
o 
Then, u*, x* solve Problem (P). 
It is easy to see that, in the case 7, ~71 -  0, (43) and (44) reduce to 
R (t)u*(t) + B'(t)l~(t) = 0, 
-t2(t) = O(t)x(t)+A'(t)lx(t),  tz(tf) =Fx(tz), 
as should be expected. 
Theorem 3.1 can be easily extended to the case where cross terms u'Lx 
exist in the integrand of (34) and to cases where more general convex cost 
functionals (34) are considered. 
4.  A Stackelberg Game with Delayed Information 
Consider the dynamic system 
2(t)=Ax(t)+Bl~(t)+Bag(t),  X(to)=Xo,  tc [to, tr],  (45) 244  JOTA: VOL. 31,  NO. 2, JUNE 1980 
and the cost functionals 
Jt =½[x'(tf)Flx(tf)+ Itl  f (x'(t)O~x(t)+ 6'(t)R~a(t)+  ~'(t)R~z~(t)) dt] , (46) 
Y2=½[x'(tf)F2x(tf)+ Itlr(x'(t)Q2x(t)+ g'(t)Rzla(t)+g(t)'R22g(t))  dt],  (47) 
where the matrices A, Bi, Qi = Q~ ~ O, Rii = R ~i >- 0 are piecewise continu- 
ous  functions  of  time  over  [to, tr]  and  Rll,  R22,  R12  are  nonsingular, 
for  all  t e [to, tr].  The  matrices  Fi =F~-> 0  and  the  time  interval  [to, q] 
are fixed. 
Consider the Stackelberg game associated with (45)-(47). The admis- 
sible strategies of the leader are of the form 
t* t 
u(xt, t) = |  [dsrl(t, s)]x(s),  (48) 
to 
where r/is as in (37) and (38), so that u ( •, t) is a continuous linear functional 
on  C([to, t],R"t),  for  each  te[to, tf]. The  admissible  strategies  of  the 
follower are  of  the  form  v(x, t),  x e R n,  t e R,  where  v  is  continuously 
differentiable  in  x  and  piecewise  continuous  in  t.  All  the  matrices  in 
(45)-(47)  are considered to be of appropriate dimensions. By xt, ~7, ~, we 
mean 
xt: [to, t] ~ R n,  xt (0) = x (0),  for all 0, t e [to, tf],  (49) 
~(t)  =  u(x~,  t),  ~(t)  =  ~(x(t),  t),  (50) 
where x (t) is the trajectory of (45) for given u and v. For each choice of u and 
v,  the behavior of the dynamic system (45)  and the values of Jr, J2  are 
unambiguously defined, assuming that the solution of (45) exists over [to, tf]. 
Actually, when the strategy (48) is considered, one might without loss of 
generality restrict ,/to be 0 for s ~  t, t c [to, tf]. The costs of the leader (J1) 
and of the follower (./2) are functions of u and v. We denote by U  and V the 
sets of admissible strategies for the leader and follower, respectively. With 
these explanations, the Stackelberg game associated with (45)-(47) is clearly 
defined. 
In the sequel, we single out a subclass of Stackelberg games with the 
nice property that the leader achieves the best possible outcome for himself; 
i.e., the leader's and follower's strategies constitute together an optimal 
control law for the control problem with cost functional J~(u, v) subject to 
the constraint of the state equation. A  similar idea occurs in Ref. 9. The 
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time) when the leader's strategy depends on information  about the present 
and  the past values of the state.  The procedure followed is the following. 
First, solve the leader's problem as a control problem with controls u, v. Let 
(~7*(t), O*(t)),x*(t)  be  the  optimum  control  pair  and  trajectory,  where 
a*(t), ~7*(t)  are  piecewise  continuous  functions  of  time.  Consider  any 
function  ~7 s  U, such that 
~7(x~*, t) =  a*(t),  for all t e [to, tj]. 
Second,  solve  the  following  inverse  control  problem:  with  u =  ff  in  the 
follower's cost, and the state equation,  minimize  Yz(~, v), and seek condi- 
tions so that v* solves this problem, and the resulting optimal trajectory for 
this problem  is again  x*(t).  So, if these conditions  are assumed to hold  a 
priori, then the pair (a, ~*) constitutes a Stackelberg pair.  One may derive 
conditions by solving the inverse control problem, where ~ depends only on 
x(t),  or on almost any subset of {x(~');  to <  ~"-< t} for each t. One may also 
single out a whole class of Stackelberg problems where the inverse control 
problem does not have v* as its solution, whatever is the tL For example, if 
f~f 
J2 =  !5'(t)F(t) dt, 
0 
then v* will be optimum iff 6*(t) -~ 0. It is trivial to exhibit now a class of Y~'s 
and A, B1, B2, so that tF*(t) ~  0. 
Consider the control problem 
minimize Yl, 
(5t) 
subject to ~7, g  piecewise continuous functions of t and (45). 
Then,  (51) has the solution 
gt*(t) = -RI~B'IKx(t),  f*(t) = -R-~B;Kx(t), 
where K  is the continuous solution of 
(52) 
-I~2=KA  + A'K  + O1-[~'[B1RllBI-1  '  + B2RT~B'2]K, 
(53) 
K(tf) = F1, t e [to, tr], 
which is assumed to exist. Let ~(t, to) be the transition matrix of the resulting 
closed-loop system in (45), i.e., 
O~(t, to)/Ot = (A-B1RI~B'~K  -1  ,  -  B2R 12 B2K)~(t,  to), 
qb(to, to) = I,  t e [to, tr].  (54) 
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given by 
x*(t; to, Xo)= gP(t, to)Xo,  (55) 
Yt*(t) = -R [~B'~Kdp(t, to)xo,  (56) 
f*(t) = -R-;d B'zK d~(t, to)xo.  (57) 
Let 7/be as in (37), (38), with r/(t, 0) = 0 for 0 -  t, and let r/satisfy the 
identity 
t 
It  [dsrl (t, s)]qb(s, t) ~  -R:I~ (t)B~ (t)K(t),  t ~ [to, tf].  (58) 
o 
If 7/satisfies (58), then 
t,  t  t  /, 
fi.*(t) = [  [d, rl(t, s)]qb(s, to)xo = [  [dsrl(t, s)]x*(s).  (59) 
at  o  `lto 
Equation  (58) characterizes all the r/'s which result in the same tT*(t)  [Eq. 
(56)], i.e., it provides a class of different representations of t~*(t) as a linear 
continuous functional of 
x* = {x*(0); to<-O<-t}. 
This class of r/'s is not empty, since for example 
0,  for 0 -> t, t ~ (to, tr], 
O(t, 0)=  R~)(t)B'l(t)K(t),  for O<t,  t~(to, tr],  (60) 
and for 0 <- to, t =  to, 
satisfies  (58).  For  fixed  t,  the  set  of  all  rt(t,. )  which  satisfy  (58)  is  the 
hyperplane 
Ht = {r/(t,  • )[r/(t,  • ) ~ NBV([to, t], R"~I×~), r/(t,  • ) perpendicular to qb(., t)}, 
shifted by r/(t,  • ) from the origin in the dual space of C([to, t], Rn×~).  A 
useful class of rt's which satisfy (58) is given by 
P 
rt(t, s) = ~(t, s) + Ho(t, s) +  •  Ai(t, s)d(s -  pi(t)),  (61) 
i=1 
where Ho is absolutely continuous in s for each t, Ai: [to, t~] × R  -~ R"U×" is 
continuous, p~: [to, tr] -* R  is continuous, d(s) = 0 for s -< 0, d(s) =  i for s >  0, 
and 
I ' 
[OHo(t,s)/Os]~(s,t)ds+  ~,  A~(t,o~(t))~(oi(t),t)=O,  on [to, tf]. 
t o  i=1 
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Another  ~/which satisfies (58) is 
0,  for 0 -> t/2,  t ~ (to, tr], 
0,  for 0 >  to,  t =  to, 
$ 
¢1 (t, s) ='  -R  ~  (t)Bi (t)K(t)  Io  dO(t, o') dcr " [2/(t-  to)],  (63) 
for 0 <  t/2,  t s  (to, tt.], 
-R-;~ (to)B~ (to)K(to),  for  0 -< to, t = to. 
Notice that 
f  to+(t--to)/2 
ti*(t) =  [ds~(t,  s)]x*(s);  (64) 
.~ t o 
i.e.,  only the first half of the trajectory up to time  t  is used in calculating 
a*(t). 
Theorem 4.1.  Assume that there exists a function *7* as in (37), (38), 
with  rff(t, 0)=0  for  O>-t,  and  an  n xn  matrix  function  P:[to, t~]-~R ~×n 
which satisfy 
t 
f  [d,,?*(t, s)]dO(s, t) =-n-~)  (t)B~ (t)K(t),  t ~ [to, q],  (65) 
o 
g'z~ (t)B'2 (t)P(t)  = R-[~ (t)B~ (t)K(t),  t ~ [to, t~],  (66) 
P(t) +  {-A'(r)P(r)  -  Oz('r) + rl*'(r,  t)Bi (r)P(z) 
t 
+~*'(r,  t)R21(r)RT~  (z)B[ (~')K(~')}dO(r, t) d~" = F2dO(t~, t), 
t ~ [to, tr].  (67) 
Then, the pair 
t* t 
u*(x,  t) = |  [dsrl*(t,  s)]x(s),  (68) 
at  o 
v*(x(t),  t)  -1  ,  = -R  t2 B t (t)K (t)x (t)  (69) 
constitutes  an  equilibrium  pair  for the  Stackelberg  game  associated  with 
(45)-(47) for any xo with strategy spaces  U  and  V. 
Proof.  We set 
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Then, the vector 
and the control 
A  (t) = (- 1, A(t)')' 
R-1  t :'/t"  v=-  22Bzat)  (71) 
satisfy the sufficiency conditions of Theorem 3.1 for the problem 
minimize Y2(u*(x, t), v), 
(72) 
subject to v ~ V  and (45), 
where u  is kept fixed equal to u*. That the u* in (68) is the leader's best 
reaction to v* in (49) is an immediate consequence of the fact that the pair 
(68), (69) solves the problem (51). 
The case where the leader's strategy is allowed to be of the form 
t 
f  [d, rl(t, s)]y(t, s), 
to 
where 
y(t,x)=C(t,x)x(s),(d/ds)C(t,s)=O,  a.e. to<_S<_t<_tf, 
with rl(t, s).  C(t, s) as in (37)-(38) can also be considered. The property 
(d/ds)C(t,  s) = 0,  a.e.  to -  s -< t -< t  I, 
allows one to write 
t  r 
I  o  o 
and thus to use directly Theorem 3.1. We only mention that, in this case, the 
leader  has restricted memory and  rt* • C  should play the  role  of  rt*  in 
(65)-(69)  in the corresponding sufficiency conditions. 
For given rt*, (67) is an integral equation for P(t). Since it has a Volterra 
kernel, if in addition it holds that A'(r) -  ~q*'(r, t)'Ba(r) is bounded by some 
M  for any to <- 7" <- t, to <- t <- tr, then the Neumann series for (67) is always 
uniformly convergent and furnishes the unique solution of (67); see Ref. 13. 
If rt*(t, s) is of the form 
k 
rt*(t, s) =  Z  H'i (t)" H*'(s), 
i=1 
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then (67) can be written as 
P(t)+  {-A'(r)+~,Hi(t)H~(r)Bi(r)}P(r)dP(r,  t) dr = F2dP(tf, t) 
+  {O2(r)- r/*'(r, t)R21(r)R-[~(r)Bi(r)g('r)}cb(r,  t) dr,  (74) 
which is an integral equation for P  with a  kernel of finite rank; thus, its 
solution is of the form 
k 
P(t) = EoCb(to, t) +  ~.  H~(t)EflP(to, t),  (75) 
i=1 
where ~o, ~  .....  Ek are constant matrices which can be found as solutions 
of algebraic linear equations. In this case, checking (66) is easy as soon as the 
~i's in (75) are found. 
If (B;KB2)-I exists over [to, t,] (it suffices that rank B2 = m2 and F1 > 0), 
then (66) is equivalent to 
P(t) = M(t) + Y(t),  M(t) =  ,  -1  -1  ,  KB2(BzKBz)  R~zR 12BzK,  (76) 
B'a(t)Y(t)=-O,  on [to, tf],  (77) 
and (67) can be transformed into an integral equation for Y. 
Theorem 4.1 suggests that, for a Stackelberg game with given A, Bb 0~, 
R~i, F~, one may try to find rt* and P which satisfy (65)-(67) and then consider 
(68), (69) as a solution. Also, by solving (67) for Oz, one can exhibit a whole 
class of Stackelberg games with solution (68), (69), where r/*, P, K, A, B1, 
B2,  FI,  Rn,  R12,  R22  are  chosen so  as  to  satisfy (53),  (54),  (65),  (66), 
Fz = P(tf), and R21 is chosen arbitrarily. 
5.  Special Cases and Generalizations 
We first apply the results of Theorem 4.1 to two special cases. 
Case  (i).  Let 
rt* = ~, 
as in (60). Then, u* in (68) assumes the form 
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Equation (65) is satisfied and (67) simplifies to 
-P(t)=P(A  -1  ,  -1  ,  ,  -B1RllB1K)+(A-B1RllB1K)P  +Q2 
--I  --5  :  --1  r  +KB1RilRa2RilNiK-PB2R22BzP,  P(tr) =F2.  (78) 
If (B~KB2) -1 exists and is differentiable on [to, tr] and if B2, KRz2R 12-1BzK' 
are differentiable on [to, tt] and of constant rank, then all the R22, Q2, F2, P 
with R22 > 0, P > 0 which satisfy (66) and (78) are given by (see Ref. 8) 
R22 = VFV',  (79) 
P  = M  + Y,  (80) 
Q2 = -16-P(A-B1R-~B~K)-(A-B1RT~B'~K)'P  (81) 
-KBIR-l~R12R[~B~K  -t  ,  + PB2R z2 BEP,  (82) 
Fz = O2(tr),  (83) 
where 
B'zKB2 =  VA V -s,  A = Jordan diagonal form,  (84) 
FA = AF,  F = F' > 0,  (85) 
B'Y=O,  Y= Y'>-O.  (86) 
If F and Y do not satisfy F > 0, Y -> 0, then one cannot conclude that R22 > 0 
and P-> 0, respectively.  Y  and R12 have to be chosen properly differenti- 
able, so that P  exists and is piecewise continuous. The above construction 
does not guarantee that 02 >- O, F2 >- O. 
Case (ii).  Let 
~l* =  ~i +  "172, 
where 
I-R~l~ (t)B~ (t)L~(t), 
_  }-R-I~  (to)B i (to)Ll(to), 
nl(t,.s) -  lo,O' 
rl2(t, s)={ (oS -t)L2(t)' 
for s<t, t~(to, tt], 
for s -  to, 
for s -  t, t ~ (to, t¢], 
for s > to, t = to, 
for s<t, te[to, t~], 
for s >-- t, 
(87a) 
(87b) 
where L1, L2 are real-valued matrices. Then, u* in (68) assumes the form 
t 
u*(xt, t) = -Rill (t)Bi (t)Ll(t)x(t) +L2(t) It  x(s) ds,  (88) 
o JOTA: VOL.  31,  NO.  2,  JUNE  1980  25t 
and (65)-(67) simplify to 
t 
-R-(~ (t)Bi (t)Ll(t) + L2(t) f  dp(s, t) ds = -R T~ (t)BI(t)K (t),  (89) 
at o 
n  ~  (t)B;(t)P(t) = -R T~ (t)B'2 (t)I£ (t),  (90) 
P(t) +  A'  ,  -1  {-  (r)P(r)-  Oe(r)-Li  (r)BI(r)R 11 (r)B~ (r)P(r) 
+(t- r)L'2(z)B'  ,  -1  -1  ,  1  (z)P(r) -LIO')BI('r)R 11 ('r)R21(r)R 1~ (~')B a (z)K(r) 
l  \  -1  +(t-r)Le(r)R21(r)Ru  (r)B~('r)K(r)}gg(r,  t) dr = F2dp(tf, t).  (9t) 
Cases (i) and (ii) are special cases of the case considered in the previous 
section.  We  will  consider  now cases  where  the  leader  uses  the  previous 
strategy values as well. In the Stackelberg game considered in Section 4, the 
value of the leader's strategy at time t was allowed to depend on the previous 
trajectory  xt={x(O); to<_O<_t}.  More  generally,  one  may  allow  that  the 
values ~7 (t) of the admissible strategies of u  of the leader at time t depend, 
not only on the previous values of x, but also on those of v. Assuming this 
dependence to be linear, we have 
t  t 
a(t)= ~ [d,~h(t,s)]x(s)+  ~ [d~713(t,s)]v(s), 
o  o 
or more generally 
t  t  t 
o  o  o 
q E Ll.k  fixed. 4 The  rtl, rlz, W~  in  (92)  are  as in  (37),  (38).  So, for a  given 
choice rll, rt2, r13 by the leader, the follower is faced with the problem 
L  '  d 
minimize } l X'(tf)Fzx(tf) +  (x'(t)OzX(t) + ~'(t)Rzlfft(t) + f(t)Rzz~(t) ) d 
subject  to i(t)=Ax(t)+Blgt(t)+Bzf(t),  X(to) =x0,  (93) 
(92), and ~7, f  piecewise continuous functions of time. 
Theorem 3.1  can now be used to derive sufficient conditions for problem 
(93). 
4 Notice that, in (92), ~7(t) depends on its own previous values. If a(t) was allowed to be any 
function of x(O), ~(0), to <- 0 ~- t, then the dependence of t2(t) on its previous values would not 
buy the leader anything additional. But, if ~,(t) is restricted to depend on x (O), 6(0), to-< 0 -< t, 
in a special form [like in (92); see also (94)-(98)], then aUowing  dependence of ~(t) on its own 
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A simple version of (92) is 
t  t 
tT(t)=~  [d,~l(t,s)]x(s)+~t  [d,~2(t,s)]z(s)+L(t)~(t),  (94) 
o  o 
where 
~(t)=,~l(t)x(t)+A2(t)z(t)+Bl(t)ft(t)+B2(t)g(t),  z(to)=Zo,  (95) 
and the matrices L, Ai, Bi are real-valued, piecewise continuous functions of 
time, and z(t)~R ~, l arbitrary. For the linear system (45) with quadratic 
costs (46), (47),  we augment (95) to (45), set ~ = (x'z')', and the system is 
A  0  B1  B2 
x(t) = [fi~l  ~2];:(t)+[~l]u(t)+[j~2]  ~(t), 
Ix°  1  =AY+/~tT+/~26,  x(t°)=  Zo  '  (96) 
with costs J~, Jz as in (46), (47) and with the strategy of the leader restricted 
to be of the form 
P  t 
u(x,, t)= |  [d,~(t, s)]~(s) + L(t)O(t).  (97) 
at  o 
The results of Section 4  are directly applicable to (96) and (97), and the 
problem is to find r~, Ai, B~, L, P  so that (65)-(67) are satisfied where in 
(65)-(67) one should use/k,/~1, (/~2  +/~IL) in place of A, B1, B2. As far as it 
concerns z0, it may be set arbitrarily equal to a constant or to a function of xo 
preferably linear. The choice of z0 might affect not only the feasibility of 
(65)-(67) but the follower's optimum cost value as well. A simpler case of 
(97) is 
a(t) = Llx(t) q- ]-~2Z (t) + L~(t),  (98) 
in which ease the solution of the Stackelberg game is easy, since the leader's 
controls are actually A~, A2, B~, B2, L1, L2, L, i.e., the leader plays open 
loop. Nonetheless, the leader's problem will be nonlinear, since his control 
multiplies the state (x', z')'. 
6.  A Nash Game with Delayed Intormation 
Consider the Nash game associated with  (45)-(47)  where,  at  each 
instant of time t, both players have access to all the previous values of the 
state. The admissible strategies for both players are of the form 
t 
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t 
v (xt, t) = ft  [dfoz(t, s)Jx (s) + b2(t).  (100) 
o 
rl~ and ~2 are as in (37) and (38); b~(t) are piecewise continuous functions of 
time with appropriate  dimensions.  By xt,  (t, ~, we mean 
a (t) =  u (x~, t), 
xt: [to, t]-~ R",  xt(O), 
~(t)  =  v(x,,  t), 
for all 0 e [to, t], for all t ~ [to, tf]. 
(lOl) 
In the next proposition,  we give sufficient conditions for a pair of the 
form (99), (100) to constitute a Nash equilibrium pair. The first part of the 
proposition refers to a particular initial point x0, while the second part gives 
conditions similar to the coupled Riccati differential equations (see Ref. 1), 
which result in solutions in feedback form which are solutions for any initial 
point x0. 
Proposition 6.1.  (i) Assume that there exist rl*, rl* as in (37) and (38), 
b*, b2* piecewise continuous,  and ~1,/x2 : [to, tr]~R ~ of bounded variation 
which satisfy 
p~i(t) -  [A'(~')/z,(~') + Oi('r)x(r)] dr +  rl*' (r, t)[Bj(r)/~i(T) 
t 
+RIj(r)R~ 1 (~')B~ (~-)/x/(r)]  d~" = F~x(tf),  i eL  i, j =  1, 2,  (102) 
t'  t 
b*(t)+|  [d~rl*(t,s)]x(s)=-R~(t)Bi(t)lzi(t),  i=1,2,  (103) 
at 0 
2(t) = A(t)x(t)-B~(t)R  [~Bi (t)ul(t)-B2(t)R~  (t)B; (t)/zz(t), 
x (to) = x0.  (104) 
Then, the strategies 
t 
u*(xt, t) = ~  [d~rl* (t, s)]x(s) + b~ (t), 
o 
t 
v *(x,, t) = ~o [d,n~ (t, s )]x(s) + b~ (t) 
(105) 
(106) 
constitute an equilibrium pair for the Nash game associated with (45)-(47), 
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(ii)  Assume  that  there  exist  r/*, r/*  as  in  (37)  and  (38)  and  matrix 
functions P1, P2: [to, t¢]--> R n x R" of bounded variation which satisfy 
?  q 
Pi(t) -Jr  (A'(r)ei(z) + Oi(r) 
+ rl ,~  -t  r  fir, t)[Bi(r)Pdr)+ R,(r)Rji  (z)Bi(¢)Pj(r)])~(%  t) d~" 
= F,.~(t~,  t),  i,]=1,2,  i¢],  (107) 
3~(t, to)/at = [A(t)-B~(t)R  ;~ (t)Bi (t)Pl(t) 
-  B2(t)R~ (t)B; (t)P2(t)]O(t, to),  ¢(to, to) = I,  (108) 
t 
I  [d~n*(t, s)] gO(s, t) = -R~(t)B'9(t)P~(t),  i= 1, 2.  (109) 
o 
Then, the strategies 
t 
u*(x,, t) = It  [ds~*(t, s)]x(s),  (110) 
o 
t 
v*(xt, t)= It  [d~*z (t, s)]x(s)  (111) 
o 
constitute an equilibrium pair for the Nash game associated with (45)-(47), 
with admissible strategies (99), (100) and for any Xo ~ R n. 
and 
Proof.  (i)  If the second player plays (100), then (102), with i =  1, ] = 2 
a ( t) = -R ~  ( t)B'o ( t )Iz l (t),  (112) 
constitute sufficient conditions for optimality, by Theorem 3.1, of ti for the 
--1  t  control problem faced by the first player.  In  (102),  the term R22BzIzz  is 
replaced  by -~[o[d, rl*]x  in  these  sufficient  conditions.  Similar  reasoning 
applies for the control problem faced by the second player when the first 
player plays (105). 
(ii)  We will first seek solutions tzl, ~2 of (102) which will work for any 
x0. Let 
I~dt) = Pdt)d~(t, to)Xo,  (113) 
where •  is as in (108). Using (111) in (102) and (103), we obtain (107) and 
(109), where we considered  b~-= O. It is clear now that,  if (107) and (109) 
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The case where the players use strategies of the form 
¢, t 
u(ylt, t) = t  [d,:qi(t, s)]yl(t, s)+~l(t), 
at o 
t,  t 
v(y2,, t) = |  [<~(t,  s)]y~(t, s) + b2(t), 
at  o 
where, for i = 1, 2, 
yi(t, s) = Ci(t, s)x(s),  to<-S <- t, 
(d/d,)Ci(t,  s) = O,  a.e. to -< s -  t --< tr, 
y;(t, s)~R% 
and 
(114) 
~,(t, s) =  ~i(t, s)G(t, s) 
are  as  in  (37)  and  (38),  can  also  be  considered.  The  strategies  (114) 
correspond  to  the  case  where  the  ith player's  information at  time  t  is 
{C,.(t, s)x(s); to <-s <- t}. We only mention that, in this case, ~*C~ should play 
the role of ~7" in the conditions of Proposition 6.1. 
The results of Proposition 6. t  [see also Problem (P')] carl be used to 
study the  Nash  game  associated  with  (45)-(47)  where  the  players  use 
previous values of their opponent's strategy values. For example, 
t  t 
o  o 
t  t 
o  o 
Strategies of the form (94), (97), (98) can be considered for the Nash game, 
and the augmentation (95) and (96) may also be employed in this case. The 
procedure  for studying sufficiency conditions for Nash  games with such 
strategies should be obvious by now and we wilI not take it up here. 
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we provided suMcient conditions for two strategies to 
constitute an equilibrium Stackelberg or Nash pair, when the players use 
previous values of the trajectory of the system and possibly previous values 
of their own or their opponent's strategies. The problem that we dealt with 
differs from those considered by Halanay in Ref. 2 and by Ciletti in Refs. 3 256  JOTA:  VOL. 31,  NO.  2, JUNE  1980 
and 4. Halanay considers the zero-sum case only, and he allows the strategy 
values at time t to depend on the part of the trajectory between t -  ~" and t, 
where  r > 0  is fixed. Ciletti considers also  the zero-sum case and  allows 
dependence of the strategy values at time t only on x(t -  o-) and the strategy 
values between  t-or  and  t,  where  o-> 0  is fixed. The strategies  that we 
considered were restricted to be affine in the data available. Existence and 
uniqueness conditions related to the sufficiency conditions proved here are 
not as yet known. Our results generalize trivially to the N-player case for a 
Nash game and to the one leader-N followers case for a Stackelberg game. 
Although, for the time being, our results are not accompanied by compu- 
tationally efficient procedures, they are of importance since they provide 
value characterizations. 
Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 3.1.  Consider the functions 
HI:R"xC. xL~,m-~C., 
H2 :R" x C. xL~,m-~ Ll,k,  (115) 
H3:R"x C. XL .... ~ R ~, 
J:R n x Cn XLm.m -". R, 
defined for (f, x, u) ~ R" x C. x L~.,~ by 
t  t 
HI(£, x, u)(t)=x(t)- /  A(z)x(z) dr- I  B('r)u(.) d.-xo, 
at o  ,Sto 
q  ~q 
H2(f, x, u)(t) = jtlo [dsr/(t, s)]x(s)+ lo~t [d~rh(t, s)]u(s)-q(t), 
(116) 
H3(f, x, u) = f-Xo-  A('r)x(r) dr-  B(~')u(~')  dz, 
o  to 
J(£, x,u)= ½[ ~s'F£+  It~"(x'(t)O(t)x(t)+ u'(t)R (t)u(t))dt]. 
o 
Clearly, H1,/-/3, J  are well defined.  To show that/-/2  is  well defined, it 
suffices to show that, if u s L ...... then 
[ q[d, rh(t, s)]u(s)~Ll,k. 
to 
Let 
u  eL ....  Iluk~ =M. JOTA:  VOL.  31,  NO.  2,  JUNI~  1980  257 
Then, there exists a sequence {u  .... 1 of continuous functions 
un : [t0, tr]-*R",  such that u,(t)~  u(t) a.e. 
and 
Iun(t)l<<-M+l,  forallte[to,  tr],foraltn; 
see Theorem 3, page 106, Ref. 14. Since 
y,~(t)=  ti~[d,'ql(t, s)]un(s) 
is measurable, 
]Y,(t)i <- (M+ 1)ml(t), 
and thus y. ~ L~  .... Since un -~ u  a.e., by Egoroff's theorem we have that  5 
for all e > O, ~t(A~) ~  O, as n -~ +co, 
where 
A,~ = {S: s ~ [to, tr], lu, (s) -  u(s)I ~  e}. 
The following holds: 
lye(t)-ftl  f [dsrl,(t, s)]u(s)t  = lltl  r [ds~q~(t, s)](u~(a)-u(s))t  <_ lla. I + liar] 
<- e  . cl(t) + (2M + 1)cl(t)t~t(A~). 
Since cx is finite a.e., letting n -~ +~, we obtain 
lim y~(t)-  l(t,s)]u(s)  <-e.cl(t),  a.e.  int~[to,  tr~, 
where lira y~  (t) stands for either limsup or liminf. Since this inequality hoids, 
for all e > O, we conclude that 
fti 
~[d~rl~(t, s)]u(s) = lim  in [to,  (117)  yn(t),  tl].  a.e. 
Since 
ly.(t)j <- (M +  1)c (t) 
and (117) holds, we conclude by Lebesgue's theorem that 
[ "[dsnl(t,  S)]U(s)6 Ll.k. 
to 
s tLt denotes the Lebesgue measure on [to, tf]. 258  JOTA:  VOL.  31,  NO.  2,  JUNE  1980 
Problem (P) can be written equivalently as 
minimize J(~:, x, u), 
subject to Hi(~, x, u) = 0,  i=1,2,3,  (118) 
(~,x,u)ER~xCnxL~,m=II. 
By Theorem 1, page 220, Ref. 15, we conclude that a sufficient condition for 
(~:*, x*, u*)  to solve (118)  is the existence  of a  (tz, A, k) e  *  (Cn, L~,k, R")*, 
such that 
J(~:*, x*, u*)+(HI(~*, x*, u*), tz) + (H2((*, x*, u*), A) 
+ (H3(~:*,  x*, u*), k) 
-<J(w)+(Hl(w),  tz)+(H2(o)), A)+(H3(w), k),  for all o) ~ f~.  (119) 
Since the function 
Y(~o) = Y(o)) + (Hi(o)),/x) + (H2(o9), A) + (H3(o)), k) 
is convex and Frechet differentiable, a necessary and sufficient condition for 
(119) to hold is that 
d](~:*, x*, u*; (, h, v)=0, 
(120) 
for all (~, h, v) ~ R ~ x C~ x L~  .... 
where  d]  denotes  the  Frechet  differential.  Straightforward  calculations 
result in the following explicit form for (120): 
((F  + k')~" =  0,  for all ~ e R",  (121) 
dt+I,o[d~'(t)]h(t)+f,i'A'(t)(S,i'[d,<77(t,s)]h(s))  dt 
+  tz'(t)A(t)h(t)dt-k'  A(t)h(t)dt=O,  for all h e C.,  (122) 
O  0 
i  tf  -  q  -  tf 
to u'(t)R(t)v(t) dt + ft] lx'(t)B(t)v(t) dt + Ito h'(t)(Ito  [dsrll(t' s)]v(s)) dt 
It  tf 
-  k'  B(t)v (t) dt = 0,  for all v ~ L ....  (123) 
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Use of the unsymmetric Fubini theorem in Ref.  12 yields 
ftlfA'(t)(£1r[d~n(t,s)]h(s))  dt=,Q~[ds(~tlrA'(t)rt(t,s)dt)]h(s),  (124) 
f£~h'(t)(fti¢[d,~h(t,s)]v(s))  dt= fti~[ ds(ftlf)t'(t)nl(t,s)  dt)]  v(s).  (125) 
Using (123) and (124) in (121) and (122), we obtain the sufficiency condi- 
tions(lO),(ll),wherewereplacedlxbytx-kandkby-F~*=-Fx(tr).  [] 
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